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Coordination among different options is key for a functioning and efficient society. However, often
coordination failures arise, resulting in serious problems both at the individual and the societal level. An
additional factor intervening in the coordination process is individual mobility, which takes place at all
scales in our world, and whose effect on coordination is not well known. In this experimental work we study
the behavior of people who play a pure coordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move
around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters
and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals.Whenwe provide themwith global information, i.e.,
the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but
not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical
simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for
policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population.
C
oordinating on a common task or adhering to a shared convention are extremely important behaviors in
society. Coordinated behavior is fundamental in work sharing as it permits more efficient outcomes than
miscoordination, as, e.g., in a production line in a factory. In shared conventions and norms, the rationale
is that conforming to the behavior of the majority already following the norm confers more welfare than taking a
different stance. Examples of the latter abound: driving on a given side of the road depending on the country,
speaking the language of themajority, dressing according to generally accepted standards, and so on. How norms
and conventions have evolved is a complex process involving many factors23. It is commonly believed that norms
and conventions become established, and can change over time through a process of evolution and learning
among themembers of a population9,21. But itmaywell be that a given norm is just imposed through authority and
enforcement against non-conforming behavior. This was the case in Sweden, for example, where the whole
country shifted from driving on the left side of the road to the right side on 3 September, 1967. Of course, to
be successful, the move had been prepared much in advance.
Norm-following behavior can be described in game-theoretical terms through pure coordination games. In
these games the idea is that if the players choose the same action, i.e. they coordinate, then they are at Nash
equilibrium and consequently they have no incentive to unilaterally change their action since this would result in
reduced payoff. For example, the following matrix, Eq. (1), represents a two-player, two-strategy pure coordina-
tion game in which one may ideally identify each strategy as a ‘‘convention’’.
a b
a
b
a,a 0,0
0,0 b,b
 ! ð1Þ
There are two pure Nash equilibria in this game: (a, a) and (b, b). The problem with this approach is that there is
no way to choose between the equilibria in the sense that they are both equally valid from the game-theoretical
point of view. In practical situations one equilibrium might be better or easier to achieve than the other. For
instance, if a is larger than b in the above game, it is likely that players will tend to coordinate on the payoff-
dominant norm a. But when payoffs are the same and there is no apparent reason to select a particular conven-
tion, the multiple equilibria problem and the ensuing indeterminacy led Schelling to the notion of a ‘‘focal point’’
or ‘‘saliency’’17 which is a piece of shared information such that people with similar backgroundwill bemore likely
to choose the coordinated solution that looksmore ‘‘salient’’ to both of them. This and other similar concepts have
been developed to try to restrict the possible solutions in these games.
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In the present work, however, we take another point of view. We
do accept that there may be multiple competing norms and that
people have to weight the advantages and the drawbacks of sticking
with a norm or switching to another one. This problem is crucially
important inmodern societies where, thanks to easymobility, people
of different backgrounds, nationality, and culture may meet in large
cities or even in whole countries. Those conventions may represent
languages, religious beliefs, dressing attitudes, preferred food, and
many others. Some of the questions that one can ask in this context
are the following: if at least two different conventions are present and
actors can move around, which one, if any, will prevail in a popu-
lation in the long run? Can different conventions coexist in a suffi-
ciently stable manner? And what could be the main factors that
influence the outcome? Since theory alone cannot provide all the
answers to these questions, in order to shed some light on this socially
important matter, researchers have tried to observe people behavior
when confronted with that kind of choice. There have been a fair
amount of experiments on pure coordination games in the past; most
of them, however, have dealt with how people coordinate on equi-
valent conventions in the absence or presence of communication and
extra-game knowledge2,3,13,14. Here psychological and cultural con-
siderations are fundamental in the selection of a ‘‘prominent’’ con-
vention. Many more experiments have been performed on the ‘‘stag
hunt’’ class of coordination games19 in which equilibria have differ-
ent properties, see e.g. Refs. 6,12. Experimental work on the stag hunt
has also recently been done on networked populations, e.g.1,20. A
complete review of the experimental work in the field of coordination
games up to 2002 can be found in Camerer’s book4. As previously
said, our goal is related but different and so we designed a new type of
laboratory experiment which is explained below.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the design of the experiment. Subsequently, we present and discuss
the main experimental results. The following section presents a
numerical simulation model based on the previous experimental
observations and its application to larger populations and longer
time horizons. The paper concludes with a discussion of the key
findings.
Experimental Design
Themain distinguishing features of our experimental setting are that
we have a spatial dimension and participants can move around.
Twenty participants occupy the cells of a virtual two-dimensional
8 3 8 grid that wraps around itself by assuming cyclic boundary
conditions. An experimental treatment consists of 30 rounds. Each
participant can only see a local neighborhood composed by the eight
cells around himself. At each round, people play with their current
neighbors according to the following pure coordination gamematrix:
a b
a
b
2,2 {1,{1
{1,{1 2,2
 ! ð2Þ
This differs from the pure coordination game of matrix 1: the Nash
equilibria are always the diagonal pairs of strategies but miscoordi-
nation has been assigned a negative payoff. This stands for the incon-
venience that may arise in many situations when interacting with the
opposite convention. After having given the necessary information
to the subjects (see SI sect. 1 for details), the experiment unfolds as
follows. At the beginning, participants receive an initial endowment
of 100 points and they are assigned to grid cells randomly such that
no two players go into the same cell. Moreover, conventions a and b,
being of equal value for partners of the same type, are also distributed
at random among players such that there are ten participants for each
convention. Before taking synchronous decisions, subjects see the
following information on their screen: their current convention, their
amount of cumulated points, and the position and convention of
their current neighbors. This is schematically shown in Fig. 1.
For each player, a round of the treatment consists of deciding
whether to keep the current convention or to switch to the alternative
one, which can be done at a cost of 10 points. We decided to set a
non-zero cost since changing conventions always requires an effort;
for instance, when traveling abroad, if one wants to interact with
people often a new language has to be learned. Next, each player
decides whether or not to freely move to a neighboring empty cell.
To avoid multiple cell occupancy, if more than one player wants to
move to the same cell only one is chosen at random. The setting just
described refers to the ‘‘local information’’ treatment, simply called
local treatment from now on. In another setting, called ‘‘global
information’’ treatment, the conditions are exactly the same except
that participants also receive the information about the number of a
and b conventions present in the population at each round, without
seeing their positions in space. Henceforth, this is named as the
global treatment.
The local treatment is clearly related to the early cellular automata
spatial segregation model of Schelling18. In the simplest form of this
famous model, two kinds of agents live close to each other in a two-
dimensional grid, but each prefers that a minimum fraction of his
neighbors be of his own type. If this threshold, which is shared by all
the agents, is not reached then the given agent will try to migrate to a
free neighboring spot. Numerical simulations of themodel show that
when there is a sufficient number of ‘‘unsatisfied’’ agents the
dynamics leads from mixing to segregated clusters of the two kinds
of agents. While the diluted grid spatial setting is identical with the
one used in our experiments, our agents are real, not automata.
Indeed, Schelling’s automata all obey the same deterministic or prob-
abilistic threshold rule, which is not the case, in principle, for human
subjects. In addition, Schelling’s automata cannot change their
action; in other words, behaviors are hard-wired. Thus, while
Shelling’s model has had inspirational value for the present work,
our experiments include payoff-based human decisions besides
mobility.
On the other hand, with the global treatment setting we aim to
represent the fact that a world-wide information, such as the per-
centage of English speakers in the country, is considered common
knowledge among the population and it can thus be found without
much effort. Indeed, thanks to informationmedia and the Internet in
particular, acquiring information about the behavior of people who
live outside our local environment is becoming increasingly cheaper.
Here, we are interested in investigating how this outside-world
information may influence group dynamics and whether it can be
helpful in reaching higher coordination levels. This setting is there-
fore realistic for a variety of social phenomena in which global
information is available.
Figure 1 | Schematic view of the neighborhood seen by participants. In
this case, the central player could choose to switch to action b by paying a
given cost, and/or to migrate to one of the empty cells indicated by the
arrows. To avoid collisions, whenmore than one player decides tomove to
a neighboring empty cell, a random player is chosen to move during that
round.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 4 : 6458 | DOI: 10.1038/srep06458 2
Results
We begin the analysis of the data obtained through the experiments
by describing first the results of the local treatment. In this setting, in
all cases (9 out of 9 times) the system stabilized in a clustered form in
which there were tight a and b clusters. These two groups were also
spatially separated because of the negative payoff that occurs for
interactions between opposite types. In other words, the population
segregates according to the two conventions. This can be seen in
Fig. 2 where we report the average size of the dominant convention
over all the treatments (black symbols). Moreover, an example of a
local treatment population observed at the end of a single run is
shown in Fig. 3 (a). All other final population states can be found
in the SI sect. 2.
Analogous results for the global treatment are also given in Fig. 2
(red symbols). It is immediately apparent that, on average, global
information significantly influences the outcome causing the preval-
ence of one convention over the other in most cases. However, mean
values hide the fact that in seven out of twelve runs all the players
aggregated into a single convention cluster, while in the other five
cases we observed a behavior similar to the local treatment in which
no convention really prevails. Figs. 3 (b) and (c) show two end of
game snapshots illustrating these two cases.
We now turn to discussing the evolution of the number of neigh-
bors adopting the same convention in local and global treatments. At
the beginning of a run the expected value of this quantity is about
one, since the initial disposition of the players in the grid is random
and because of the equally distributed number of conventions among
participants. However, as time goes by, players following the same
convention tend to stick together and the value steadily increases for
both treatments until it reaches a value around four. This value is
almost equal to the number of connections participants have at the
end of the treatment. This means that participants neighborhoods
are mostly composed by players adopting the same convention.
However, in the global treatment, participants are able to reach a
slightly larger number of neighbors of the same convention because
of the higher global coordination level achieved (see SI Fig. S5 for
further details). The difference between final values of local and
global treatments is statistically significant (aggregating per treat-
ment, P , 0.1; considering single individuals per treatment, P ,
0.05).
Figure 4 depicts one interesting aspect of the dynamics; it reports
the fraction of participants that changed convention at each round
averaged over all the sessions for local (black symbols) and global
(red symbols) treatments. People change action at low rate at the
beginning but later on they tend to stick to their current convention.
This is true for both local and global treatments and there is no
statistically significant difference between the two. Figure 4 also
reports the fraction of participants moving to another position for
local (in blue) and global (in orange) treatments. Here we see that the
fraction of participantsmoving to another position starts at about 0.6
and goes down with time, but never becomes zero. In other words,
even at the end of the run some participants are still moving around.
Overall, subjects prefer to move in order to meet other people adopt-
ing the same convention rather than changing convention since the
latter is costly while moving to another cell is cost-free.
A key point in the experiment was to get an understanding of the
reasons that motivate the participants’ convention change and dis-
placement decisions. In order to do so, we studied the frequency of
these decisions as a function of the number of neighbors of the same
or the opposite type they see in their neighborhood. These quantities,
a priori, seemed to play an important role. Figure 5 (a) shows the
average frequency of convention changes and Fig. 5 (b) is the average
frequency of walking to a neighboring empty cell. From Fig. 5 (a) it
appears that when participants see some players of the same type they
are reluctant to switch to the other convention and this trend
becomes stronger as the number of neighbors of the same type
increases. Conversely, when they see at least two neighbors of the
opposite type they have a tendency to pay the cost and switch to the
other convention. The propensity to switch conventions in this case
is higher in the global information treatment thanks to the reinforce-
ment effect of the global signal.
As for the frequency of movement (Fig. 5 (b)), when there are four
or more neighbors of the same type, i.e. about 50%, participants are
satisfied and have little incentive to move, a situation reminiscent of
Schelling’s cellular automaton model. However, when neighbors of
the same type are not enough, people tend to move with positive
probability. This unsatisfied behavior also justifiesmobility in the last
rounds (see Fig. 4). The mobility behavior as a function of the num-
ber of neighbors of the opposite type is different and more interest-
ing. We see that mobility is maximal around a value of two or three
different neighbors. With more neighbors adopting the opposite
convention it appears from Fig. 5 (a) that participants are more likely
to change convention rather than to move. Indeed, it seems rational
to pay a price in order to benefit from a future gain in the expectation
that the new configuration will remain stable at least for a couple of
time steps. These results can be seen in a complementary way by
plotting the empirical frequencies of convention change and of dis-
placement as a function of the difference between the number of
neighbors of the same type minus those of the opposite type (see
SI Fig. S7).
From these results we conclude that unsatisfied participants prefer
to move rather than to change convention, given that the latter
entails an effort in real life represented as a cost in our experiment.
When only local information is available, the society of players tends
to split into two clusters, one for each convention. On the other hand,
when global information on the fraction of strategies in the whole
population is provided, the most likely result is the convergence
towards a cluster of the same type, with a and b being equally likely
by definition. However, even with global information, we sometimes
observed the formation of two different type clusters having almost
the same size. A study of the fine dynamics of the evolution shows
that the main drive for the dynamics can be attributed to the com-
Figure 2 | Dominant convention size for local and global treatments.This
measure represents the global coordination level achieved by participants.
Both values are averages and are depicted with standard error bars. At the
beginning, conventions are equally distributed among participants, but, as
time goes by, they become unbalanced reaching higher coordination levels
in the global treatment case. The difference between final values has
statistical significance (P , 0.01).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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bination of the numbers of subjects of the same and of the opposite
type in the neighborhood of a given player.
Numerical Simulation Model. Starting from the pioneering work of
Schelling17, several theoretical models of convention evolution in
spatial populations have been published. Among others, Mukherjee
et al.15 proposed a simulationmodel for the problem in which artificial
agents use learning in a complete grid to choose a convention but
without mobility. Dall’Asta et al. published a theoretical paper of the
original Schelling model based on statistical physics techniques7.
Collard and Mesmoudi5 have proposed a model based on Schelling
in which there is both heterogeneity of agents’ preferences and
learning. Finally, Zhang proposes a theoretical model of residential
segregation evolution on a grid using the theory of stochastic games24.
These theoretical and simulationmodels are interesting but would
not be able to forecast or reproduce any particular set of data coming
from a laboratory experiment such as ours because of their lack of
diversity and heterogeneity of behavior. Instead, here we would like
to follow another more empirical approach based on our experi-
mental observations. The goal is not a general abstract model of
how people behave in spatial convention evolution but rather, more
modestly, to be able to numerically simulate larger societies of ‘‘aver-
age agents’’ that behave similarly to our experimental subjects. This
seems to us a useful step because for technical and financial reasons
larger populations for longer time horizons cannot be studied
experimentally.
The important feature of the model is to state precisely how sub-
jects decide to change convention and how they decide to move.
From the observation of the participants’ behavior, we make the
hypothesis that the key factor for changing conventions and for
moving is the number and type of individuals in the neighborhood
around a given player. Thus, let us define a variable
D~# same type neighborsf g{# opposite type neighborsf g
for the neighborhood of a given focal individual. We then define for
the local information model the probability function pc,L (D) of
changing convention and the probability function pm,L (D) ofmoving
to a neighboring empty cell. Here c and m stand for convention
change and movement, respectively, and L refers to the local model.
Functions pc,G (D, i) and pm,G (D, i) are used for the global informa-
tion model (G). The global information value 0# i# 1 is defined as
the percentage of players in the population adopting the opposite
convention. The form of pc,L (D) used here is similar in spirit to the
Figure 3 | Characteristic arrangement of participant conventions at the end of local and global treatments (see SI sect. 2 to find all other final
configurations). The viewpoint of the toroidal space has been chosen so as to see the clusters in the middle of the grid. (a) In the local treatment
participants always form (9 out of 9 times) two groups of similar size that adopt different conventions; clusters repel each other because of the negative
payoff for the interaction between different conventions. (b) In the first scenario of the global treatment participants fully, or almost fully, converge (7 out
of 12 times) to the same convention and they form a unique group maximizing their number of connections. (c) In the second scenario of the global
treatment (5 out of 12 times), conventions balance remains equilibrate during the whole run and participants behavior looks analogous to the one seen in
the local treatment case.
Figure 4 | Average frequency of movement and convention changing
decisions per round. Values are depicted with standard error bars. Black
and red values represent convention changing frequency for local and
global treatments, respectively. Only a small percentage of people changed
convention during the whole experiment and almost all of them did it
during the initial rounds. Blue and orange values represent subjects
mobility for local and global treatments, respectively. At the beginning
mobility is high but it tends to decrease with time for both treatments.
Mobility never attains zero because of the persistent presence of unsatisfied
players who move around the border of their cluster. Differences among
treatments are not statistically significant (P . 0.35).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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one proposed by Romero et al.16 in the study of hashtag diffusion in
Twitter.
From the experimental data points (see SI Fig. S8), we found pc,L5
0, forD$ 0, and pc,L5 1, forD#25. Then, the simplest assumption
which qualitatively agrees with the data is to use the straight line pc,L
5 2D/5 in the range 25 , D , 0. To estimate pm,L and to keep
things as simple as possible, we fitted experimental data points in the
range25#D# 5 with two symmetric lines with amaximum of 0.75
forD5 0. The corresponding equations are: pm,L5 0.751 0.15D, for
25#D# 0, and pm,L5 0.752 0.15D, for 0,D# 5. pm,L5 0 for all
other values.
From the experimental data we observed that the empirical fre-
quency of moving has the same shape for both the local and global
information treatments (see SI Fig. S7). Therefore, we assumed pm,L
5 pm,G. On the other hand, experimental results clearly show that
action changes are influenced by the availability of global informa-
tion. We model this situation introducing eq. 3:
pc,G D,ið Þ~
0 if lv0
l if 0ƒlƒ1
1 otherwise,
8><
>: ð3Þ
where l 5 (2i 2 1) 1 2(1 2 i)pc,L.
We can see that when global information i5 0.5, i.e. when there is
an equal number of the two conventions in the grid, i does not
provide any positive or negative signal to the individuals, and thus
equation 3 reduces to the local information model, pc,G 5 pc,L.
Conversely, when i R 1, it follows that pc,G R 1 since most, or all
the other players follow the opposite convention. Finally, for iR 0,
the probability pc,G to change convention is positive only if pc,L. 0.5
that is, only if the opposite convention is strongly dominant in its
neighborhood (see SI Fig. S9 for further details).
Having defined how agents take their decisions, the population
evolution is simulated by two stochastic processes at each time step t
for each agent in the population: the update of agent’s current action
according to probability pc, and the movement to a neighboring free
position according to probability pm. Since the population evolution
is synchronous in time, each step occurs simultaneously as in the
laboratory experiment. When an agent decides to move to a neigh-
boring free position she does so in an opportunistic way, choosing the
most profitable position among those available. In taking this
decision the agent only sees the subset of cells that belong to her
original neighborhood; she has no information on the rest of her new
neighborhood. When two or more agents try to move to the same
empty cell, the collision is resolved randomly. If there are no empty
cells around a given agent, the agent doesn’t move.
To validate the model, we provide results for the experimental
laboratory setting values in the SI sect. 5. But, as said above, one of
the advantages of simulations is that they can be applied to larger
systems and for longer time horizons, both of which are very useful to
overcome the technical and financial limitations of experiments with
human participants, once a suitable model is available. Besides, other
values of the system parameters can be quickly tested, as we do below
with the system density. The results are reported in Fig. 6. Figure 6 (a)
shows the behavior of the predominant convention size for several
grid sides L from L 5 4 up to L 5 40; the agent density is 1/3. The
curves depict this quantity at three different time steps in the evolu-
tion: t5 30, as in the experiment, t5 300, and t5 3000. Figures 6 (b)
and (c) show the same results but for density 1/2 and 2/3 respectively.
The important phenomenon to note here is that, in the local model
and for all tried densities, convergence to a single convention only
occurs for small grid sizes. When the populations evolve in larger
grids clusters of individuals following different conventions form but
do not merge and they remain segregated. This does not happen
Figure 5 | Average frequency of convention change (a) and of displacement (b) as a function of the number of neighbors adopting the same or the
opposite convention. Values are depicted with standard error bars. There are no relevant observations for values greater than four. Black and red values
represent local and global treatments, respectively, as a function of the number of the same type of neighbors. Blue and orange values stand for local and
global treatments, respectively, as a function of the number of opposite type neighbors. (a) People are reluctant to change convention when they have at
least one neighbor of the same type. It is apparent that the larger the number of opposite type individuals in the neighborhood, the higher the frequency of
convention change. (b) Movement decision frequencies tend to quickly decrease with the number of neighbors of the same type, i.e. players are satisfied
with at least four neighbors of their type. On the other hand, opposite convention curves are not monotonic and have amaximum between two and three
opposite type neighbors.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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when global information is made available to the agents, in which
case the tendency is toward convergence of the population to a single
convention in all cases given enough time. In a different setting
related results have recently been obtained by Gleeson et al.10.
These authors study the likelihood of adopting applications in
Facebook as a function of the number of applications installed in a
given time window. They find that recent levels of application’s
installation activity aremuchmore important than cumulative adop-
tion levels, which means that local data in the temporal sense are
more important than global ones, differently from what we found in
our spatially extended system.
Discussion
Our main finding is that the type of information available to the
population has a dramatic effect on the possibility of reaching general
consensus. In the local treatment we have observed that the popu-
lation segregates into two spatially isolated groups, one for each
convention. We stress that we have never observed convergence to
adopting a unique convention in this setup. On the contrary, when
global information is provided, people can reach higher levels of
global coordination, albeit we observe two different scenarios. In
the first one, equilibrium between the two conventions remains
stable during the whole experimental session and people cannot
recognize a dominant convention in the population. This leads to a
final population structure that is very similar to that observed in the
local treatment. However, when equilibrium between the two con-
ventions is not stable and an appreciable majority begins to form, the
knowledge of the convention dominating the population allows peo-
ple to reach a consensus and to aggregate in a unique monomorphic
cluster.
Beyond our findings in terms of consensus, we have been able to
extract the behavioral pattern of the average individual. Thus, we
have observed that, given that changing conventions is costly, sub-
jects accordingly try to move when they are in a neighborhood with
few occupied cells and those occupied adhere more to the opposite
convention, and only change convention when they are in the pres-
ence of several neighbors, almost of all them agreeing. Based on these
simple and quite natural rules, we have proposed a model that allows
us to study the dependence of our results on variables such as ‘world’
size, population density, and longer duration of interactions. The
model, which is in good qualitatively agreement with our experi-
mental results, shows that in very small environments with only local
information available, consensus can be reached as with global
information, but after much longer interaction times. In larger sys-
tems, however, when global information is provided to individuals
they can always converge to a unique convention in the population
(given enough time), but local information alone leads to smaller
coordination levels and spatial segregation. These results are quali-
tatively the same for a range of population densities, in so far as they
are not so small as to prevent interaction, or so large that mobility is
seriously hindered.
This experimental work has important implications in a number
of real life contexts. Thus, our results suggest that when changing a
convention is costly and interacting with the other convention det-
rimental, like in situations where a sizable group of people who
should work together use different standards, or in collaborations
where a common language is needed, population mobility is not
enough to induce a common choice. Indeed, mobility would only
lead to segregation by conventions, andwhen the segregation process
is completed interaction ceases. On the basis of our results, one could
think that providing information on how the adoption of conven-
tions is going could help, but as we have seen something else is
required, namely that this information conveys the feeling that an
overwhelming majority is forming and that it is for the best to con-
form to their convention. While the adoption rates are still close, the
process could still end up in segregation. Therefore, providing such
global information as a way of policymaking to encourage consensus
is not enough, and should be complemented with incentives for part
of the population to change their choice, so amajority begins to form.
Even then, we have also seen that there are individuals who never
change even when they are the last ones left of their choice. Whether
this was due to a misunderstanding of the instruction or to unreas-
onable stubborness is debatable, but in any event it is a clear indica-
tion that one cannot expect in general to achieve perfect consensus.
In fact, in a large, mobile population such subjects may end up
grouping and becoming a prejudicial influence. On the other hand,
the fact that people are reluctant to change conventions is in good
agreement with the daily life observation of the coexistence of choices
(such as different phone companies, or operating systems, or even
languages). When individuals are locally satisfied because they have
many neighbors with the same preference, they do not have incen-
tives to switch to the other option or to move. Of course, in the long
run the rational preference should be to go along with the majority,
but as our simulations show, this may be a very long term limit (not
dissimilar to the ultra long runs discussed by Young22), and therefore
in practice those convention may coexist forever. Thus, it becomes
Figure 6 | Dominant convention size for local and global models at different density, grid side, and time horizon. The values are averages over 100 runs
in each case and standard error bars are shown. Black curves correspond to the local model while red curves are for the global model. The
population density, from left to right, is 1/3 (a), 1/2 (b), and 2/3 (c). Numerical results for the experimental laboratory setting are reported in panel (a)
where agent density is 1/3 and for a grid side of eight cells. Values at 30 time steps for local and global models qualitatively agree with those observed in the
laboratory experiment (see final values of Fig. 2).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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quite clear that the process of convergence to consensus may cer-
tainly be complicated and, while our experiment opens the door to
understanding howmobile populations evolve or not towards global
agreement, further research is needed to fully unveil all the effects
relevant for such an ubiquitous problem.
Methods
The use of human subjects in this experiment has been approved by the Ethics
Committee of the University of Lausanne. The participants were fully informed of the
nature of the experiment and signed an informed consent to participate. Their
anonymity has been guaranteed at all stages of the experiment.
We conducted a total of seven experimental sessions in October 2013 in a specially
equipped laboratory using the z-Tree environment8. Each session involved 20 par-
ticipants and a total of 140 subjects took part in the experiment. Each session con-
sisted of three repetitions of the same treatment played by the same group but with
new random initial conditions. Participants were recruited using ORSEE11 from a
subject pool that includes students from several faculties of the University of
Lausanne and of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL).
Students read a detailed description of the experiment before playing the game.
After reading the instructions, subjects had to respond to a set of control questions
that insured common understanding of the game and the computation of payoffs. An
English translation of the instructions distributed to subjects is provided (see SI sect.
1). Each session lasted about 90 minutes. Participants earned a certain number of
points during the experiment and their final score in points was converted at an
exchange rate of 1.- CHF 5 30 points. The average gain per student was 33.5 CHF
(about 38 USD). All statistical results have been obtained performing t-test analysis
and assuming an independent observation for each new treatment. Observations are
also assumed to be unpaired samples and with unequal variance.
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